

The Post-9/11 American Serviceman

By ADAM B. LOWTHER

Soon after the beginning of Operations *Enduring Freedom* (OEF) and *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF), the composition of the American military came under intense scrutiny. Pundits and talking heads were quick to go to the news media and suggest that the military is racist, sexist, and conspicuously lacking in wealthy whites whose fathers, they claimed, initiated our current conflicts.¹ Had these critics of the Nation's military examined recent research, they would have understood that much of what they were asserting is inaccurate. The facts present a different picture than what is often accepted as conventional wisdom.

This article examines demographic, personality typology, leadership psychology, and worldview literature to develop a composite sketch of the American Serviceman. Although incomplete, current research provides ample evidence to dispel many of the most egregious myths about the composition of the military. Providing a more accurate description of the Nation's fighting men and women is therefore the focus of this work.

In the second half of the 20th century, scholars began to analyze the psychology, values, and demographic characteristics of the military. This analysis brought some startling insights. In the preface to *The Professional*

Soldier (1960), one of the earliest works on the subject, Morris Janowitz argued:

The military face a crisis as a profession: How can it organize itself to meet its multiple functions of strategic deterrence, limited warfare, and enlarged politico-military responsibility? First, there is continuous technological change. Second, there is the necessity of redefining strategy, doctrine, and professional self-conceptions. Maintaining an effective organization while participating in emerging

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Army research psychologist briefs GEN Casey on resiliency training

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*schemes, such as nuclear test controls or regional security arrangements, will require new conceptions and produce new tasks for the military profession.*²

These words still ring true five decades later. Despite unprecedented change in the international security environment, the profession of arms always appears to be in crisis. Perhaps Janowitz was wrong. In place of the ever-present “crisis” may be the professional soldier’s eternal adjustment to an ever-changing strategic environment. Whatever the case may be, Janowitz’s original question remains poignant.

In offering an alternative explanation of civil-military relations in the United States to the earlier work of Samuel Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* (1957), Janowitz inaugurated what remains a hotly contested debate about the nature of the military within society and those characteristics that set it apart from the public it defends.³ While there is some consensus that military members are substantively different from the broader society, there is little agreement on exactly how different and why.⁴

Military Demographics

In the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War, the United States ended the draft (1973) and moved to an all-volunteer force. Then, as today, critics of this force claimed that the military would draw recruits

from poor black neighborhoods, while allowing white elites to eschew military service.⁵ Elite participation did decline, but the Nation’s military is not drawn from the urban poor. In fact, the demographic picture of the U.S. military is quite different.

Household Income. According to recent studies, recruits came from households with an average annual income of \$43,122 (1999 dollars), slightly above the national average of \$41,994.⁶ As a percentage of the 18- to 24-year-old population, from which most recruits are drawn, average household incomes fell into two economic groups: \$35,000–\$79,999, and \$85,000–\$94,999.⁷ These socioeconomic

the percentage of recruits from high-income households has increased since 9/11 while the percentage from low-income households declined


groups were overrepresented among recruits while families in the highest and lowest socioeconomic groups were underrepresented.⁸ Interestingly, the percentage of recruits from high-income households has increased since 9/11 while the percentage from low-income households declined.⁹ In 2005, 22.8 percent of recruits came from the richest quintile, while only 13.7 percent came from the poorest. Thus, the average enlistee is drawn from

the middle class, not the urban poor. Data were not available for incoming officers and military academy accessions. Socioeconomic status also correlates to other desirable variables such as work ethic, intelligence, and aptitude, which are discussed below.¹⁰

Education. On average, the military is better educated than the rest of society.¹¹ Ninety-eight percent of military members hold at least a high school diploma, while the national average is 75 percent.¹² Enlistees and officers also score above the national average in standardized reading and math tests. Interestingly, Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)/Armed Force Quotient Test scores demonstrate that today’s enlistees are more intelligent than enlistees before 9/11.¹³ In addition, veterans enrolled in college maintain a grade point average above the mean.¹⁴ Thus, those who suggest that the military has lowered its standard to meet recruiting needs are incorrect. The opposite has occurred. Americans who choose to enlist or take commissions in the military are better educated and more intelligent today than at any time since the collection of data began.

Race. In 2004, 75.6 percent of the adult population in the United States considered itself Caucasian. In 2006, 77.99 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds in the United States described themselves as Caucasian.¹⁵ Of the recruits (enlisted) entering the military in 2004, 73.1 percent were Caucasian. Moreover, 75.43 percent of all Active-duty Servicemembers between the ages of 18 and 24 identified themselves as Caucasian.¹⁶ Thus, there is an almost 1 to 1 ratio of whites within society and the military. When broken into the subsets of white non-Hispanic (84.57 percent) and white Hispanic (15.43 percent), Hispanics represent just under 10 percent of the total force—a slight underrepresentation.¹⁷

Blacks and Asians have the highest and lowest levels of representation—proportionally—in the U.S. military. Contrary to popular belief, in the years following the draft, blacks increasingly joined the military because of the fair treatment it is perceived to offer. By 1990, they made up about 20 percent of the military while accounting for only 13 percent of the population. Seen as an egalitarian institution where skin color did not inhibit advancement, black enlistees and officers joined the military and self-selected to serve primarily in administrative, supply, and support roles.¹⁸ But in the years since 9/11, black participation in the



Army recruits wait to inprocess during basic combat training

U.S. Air Force (Micky M. Bazaldua)

military has declined, although it remains around 15 percent.¹⁹

Evidence suggests that the black decline is a result of several factors. First, the rationale for joining the military is largely related to the open nature of military culture and the opportunities it provides. As the Government Accountability Office notes, “Historically, many African Americans enlisted for tangible reasons and were more likely than white or Hispanic enlisted personnel to be in noncombat occupations and make a career of the military.”²⁰ When viewed as an avenue for advancement, the military is less attractive during time of war and high operational

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tempo.²¹ Second, the unpopular nature of the Iraq War and the strong affinity of African-Americans for the Democratic Party may also help to explain why black recruitment declined after 9/11.

Asians, on the other hand, are given limited attention in the demographic literature.²² Why Asians are underrepresented is not well known. Thus, it must suffice to say that Asians make up 3.6 percent of the military and 4.8 percent of the general population.²³

Region. Equally important to the variables described thus far is geographic region. Among the four examined (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), the South and West account for 65 percent of all recruits, with the South accounting for 42 percent.²⁴ Although the Northeast and Midwest account for 41 percent of the population (ages 18–24), 35 percent of recruits were drawn from these regions.²⁵ Research confirms the common belief that there is a strong “Southern military tradition,” although Southerners do not dominate the leadership of the military as completely as they did early in the 20th century.

Gender. Historically, the military is a bastion of masculinity. But wars have frequently provided women the opportunity to serve, for example, in the Women’s Air Corps and as nurses, secretaries, and clerks. The military began to open its ranks after World War II. The number of women in the military doubled from 1980 to 2003, rising from 8.4 to 15 percent.²⁶ While this is certainly

disproportionately low—women are slightly more than half the population—there is little effort to equalize the ratio of men and women in the military. Moreover, with few exceptions (combat arms), women are now serving in most career fields.

The most recent data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics offer an additional point of interest related to gender: Of the applicants for Active enlistment in the four Services (Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force), a higher percentage of females score in the “Tier I” category on the ASVAB than males. Simply stated, on average, females in the military are smarter than their male counterparts.

Population Density. One final variable offers substantive demographic explanatory power. Over 71 percent of recruits in 2003 came from suburban and rural areas. Urban areas, which account for 40 percent of the population (ages 18–24), account for less than 29 percent of the military.²⁷ Rural areas are the most overrepresented proportionally. Thus, the view that the urban poor are the Nation’s warfighters is unsubstantiated, although it is correct to suggest that “small towns pay a big price.”²⁸

If a composite sketch of the average Servicemember were drawn, *he* would be a white high school graduate from a middle-class family in the suburbs or exurbs somewhere in the South or West. Again, this

is based on statistical averages, not on any single slice of the military, which may offer a very different picture.

Before turning to the recent literature on personality typology and military leadership psychology, a look at self-selection in the all-volunteer force is relevant to the broader discussion. Not only does an all-volunteer force attract certain personality types, but it also attracts adventurous, patriotic, and upwardly mobile Americans. As the Government Accountability Office has noted, above-average white males join the military and the combat arms in particular from a sense of patriotism and adventure. The post-9/11 spike in recruitment of white males from the highest economic quintile illustrates this point. But this does not suggest that these recruits do not join the military to learn skills and earn educational benefits, as is more commonly the case for blacks and women.²⁹

It is also worth noting that current estimates of the eligible population (ages 18–24) suggest that approximately 7 out of 10 American youths are unfit for service because they have criminal records, cannot meet the minimum intellectual requirements, are physically unfit, and/or have a history of drug use.³⁰ Thus, the eligible population is highly winnowed before the decision to join the Service is made. And, contrary to popular myth, the military



U.S. Army Signal Corps

does not accept the Nation's prison-bound young men.

Personality Typology

Although psychologists began examining personality typology in the early 1930s, there is no universally accepted set of personality traits and methods for their measurement.³¹ There are also no recent and publicly available large studies examining personality characteristics of military members. This leaves the researcher to extract and compile relevant data from numerous and often incongruous sources to develop a composite sketch of the average military personality.

Within the rather small cadre of psychologists who study the military, there are a number of tools and methodologies used to develop personality profiles and measure leadership traits.³² Studies examining leadership success at West Point, completion of Undergraduate Pilot Training, and completion of naval basic electrical and electronic training offer unique insights.³³

As the literature notes, recruits offer three main reasons for joining the Services: educational benefits and training, adventure, and patriotism. The value placed on each varies with the individual. With that in mind, we turn to personality typology and the traits that often set military members apart from their civilian counterparts.

Courage. In a study of West Point cadets, courage was the most highly valued character trait, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence and expected acculturation. For example, Army Field Manual 6–22, *Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile*, lists the Army's seven core values relative to leadership: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that courage is a trait more readily evident in the military, as well as a value cultivated and necessary for advancement to senior officer and enlisted ranks. An anecdotal example demonstrates the great value placed on courage. As General Oliver Smith, commander of the First Marine Division during the first years of the Korean War, wrote:

*During the Reservoir operation I was never concerned about the security of Koto-ri. When he was told to go hold Koto-ri, Lewie [Lewis "Chesty" Puller] never questioned whether or not he had enough men to hold it; he simply made up his mind to hold it. His very presence reassured men; and he circulated constantly. The men knew Colonel Puller's reputation, that he had emerged with credit from many critical situations, and here he was in the flesh exuding confidence.*³⁴

As the most decorated Marine in American history, Lewis Puller was widely known for his personal courage. It is a trait that has real value in combat, as the preceding passage demonstrates. One Marine chaplain echoed a similar sentiment concerning the Marines under Colonel Puller's command, stating,

it is understandable that risk-acceptant behavior would be inculcated as a trait among Servicemembers who are already more risk-acceptant than society at large

"You cannot exaggerate about the Marines. They are convinced to the point of arrogance that they are the most ferocious fighters on earth—and the amusing thing about it is that they are."³⁵

Numerous quotations, similar in character, could be drawn from a variety of sources chronicling the exploits of many Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen. The importance, however, is to highlight the value of courage as a character trait, innate or learned, in members of the military.

Risk-taking. Related to courage is a second personality trait—risk-taking. A long-term study sponsored by the Army followed 675,626 Soldiers likely to be deployed to the Persian Gulf during Gulf War I.³⁶ Consistent with studies showing a lack of prudence and high levels of courage, results demonstrated a higher acceptance of risk-taking behaviors among Soldiers who deployed during the war. Interestingly, these "risk-acceptant" Soldiers were also physically and mentally healthier than their Army counterparts who did not deploy.³⁷

Returning to the example of (later) General Puller, while serving as a battalion commander in World War II and a regimental commander in Korea, Puller consistently established his command post far closer to the frontlines than doctrine prescribed or other commanders practiced.³⁸ Puller's risk-taking encouraged his peers and subordinates to take greater risks themselves. Thus, it is understandable that risk-acceptant behavior would be inculcated as a trait among Servicemembers who are already more risk-acceptant than society at large.

Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Curtis E. LeMay acted similarly. During his first raid over St. Nazaire in late 1942, LeMay implemented a new bombing technique that placed B-17 crews at increased risk. To assuage fears and instill risk acceptance in 305th Bomb Wing crew members, LeMay flew the lead—a habit he regularly practiced. His courage and risk acceptance led to the development of a highly successful bombing formation.³⁹

Hardiness. A personality trait deserving special attention because it plays a key role in fostering other desirable traits is hardiness—that *resiliency* in the face of stress which

can make or break an individual's will when facing seemingly impossible circumstances.⁴⁰ While it is a trait found in abundance, it is not one that is learned. As one author notes, "The data suggest that Americans attracted to attend a service academy display a set of values consistent with U.S. military doctrine."⁴¹ Just how far this study can be generalized across the Services is unknown, but the demands of military life and work are likely to cause a strong self-selection bias toward hardy individuals.



U.S. Air Force

Gen Curtis LeMay led by example to instill risk acceptance in Airmen

The value of hardiness cannot be emphasized enough. As with many of the other demographic variables and personality traits, the exhibition of one trait is often correlated with additional traits. Thus, positive and negative traits tend to be mutually reinforcing.⁴²

Prudence. Members of the military exhibit a *dearth* of this important trait. As one study found, lower levels of prudence are seen in the military than in the general public.⁴³ Such a finding is expected. It is, however, interesting to note that senior military leaders are often risk-averse and, as examples in the historical record demonstrate, are often reluctant to make decisions where the outcome does not have a high probability of success. The exact nature of prudence and its variation among senior versus junior military personnel has not been studied. It could be because of “careerism” that senior officers are more prudent than junior officers. Or it could be the greater consequence of decisions that promote increased risk aversion. It could even be the difference in maturity between a senior leader and junior troops. Whatever the case, it is likely that senior officers will exhibit greater reluctance to take significant risks.

A composite sketch of military personnel suggests that on average Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen are courageous, risk-acceptant, and hardy. They are not, however, prudent. Additionally, data suggest that members of the military are also above average in intelligence, adventurous, and ambitious. While these findings are useful, more information is needed.

Leadership Psychology

In one of the most recent studies of military leadership (2009), the authors administered the NEO-PI-R Personality Inventory to a group of officers who rated the leadership abilities of their peers.⁴⁴ This is of particular relevance because it may offer some insight into the personalities of senior leaders making decisions at the highest levels now and in the future. As previous research has demonstrated, peer ratings are a highly reliable predictor of officer success.⁴⁵

The five personality traits included in the inventory are neuroticism (anxious, insecure, moody, and negative), extraversion (affiliative and social), openness to experience (nonconforming, autonomous, and imaginative), agreeableness (caring, cooperative, and tolerant), and conscientiousness

(dependable and achievement-oriented). Those high in extraversion, openness to experience, and conscientiousness were rated as effective leaders. Those seen as neurotic were not. The effects of agreeableness on leadership success were inconclusive.⁴⁶ These results suggest that current and future decisionmakers are positive in their outlook, which feeds into the military’s “can-do” attitude and the optimistic outcome most Servicemembers expect when conducting operations. They also suggest that leaders are likely to see obstacles as something to overcome rather than as limiting factors. The optimism that precedes conflict should not be overestimated. In most recent conflicts, prewar thinking among senior leaders suggested higher casualties than occurred (risk aversion), although that was accompanied by guaranteed success. Junior officers, however, often expected a quicker victory than was achieved.

Some additional conclusions can be drawn from the study’s findings. First, effective leaders (and those most likely to be promoted to senior ranks) tend to be less emotional than ineffective leaders. Second, effective leaders are also likely to defer to others and cooperate rather than compete. This second finding is also supported by anecdotal evidence frequently repeated within the military. It is often suggested that general officers do not reach senior rank by taking risks, but by moderating positions and seeking consensus. Portraits of a number of past Service Chiefs and Joint Chiefs of Staff are consistent with this conception, while portraits of the Nation’s great warrior-commanders look very different.⁴⁷

Military officers most likely to be promoted and, therefore, influence the leadership styles of subordinates are extraverts open to new experiences and are conscientious about their decisions. They are also likely to seek consensus before making a decision, while avoiding risks that offer high costs and low rewards. Separate, but related, they are likely to minimize casualties while relying on technological advantage.

Worldview

Returning to the civil-military relations literature is, in part, for the purpose of examining the worldview of the officer corps, a topic often overlooked. The worldview held by officers and enlisted is decidedly different from that of the American public writ large.

For those unfamiliar with the study of worldviews, one author describes a “world-view” as the answer to three questions: Who are we and where did we come from? What is wrong with the world? How can it be fixed?⁴⁸ Different worldviews answer each of these questions in their own unique ways.

A clear majority in the military adhere to a decidedly Judeo-Christian worldview, which holds a belief in a higher power, absolute truth, the real presence of good and evil in the world, and the ultimate triumph of good over evil.⁴⁹ This clear moral compass leads many in the military to look at American society as degenerate and lacking in those qualities that once made the Nation great.⁵⁰ It is the military, according to some Servicemembers, that exemplifies moral rectitude. Military sociologists such as Charles Moskos have lamented the seemingly growing separation between the broader society and the military.

those high in extraversion, openness to experience, and conscientiousness were rated as effective leaders

Religion. Military officers are more likely to participate in religious services than the enlisted ranks, but this is largely due to the high proportion of young single enlisted men.⁵¹ As civilians, young men are also less likely to attend religious services than their elders. What separates the military, officers and enlisted, from the rest of society is the clear predominance of an identifiable right and wrong.⁵² For elites who govern the country, attend Ivy League universities, and run large firms, a secular worldview is much more common. The notion of “personal truth” is antithetical to the nature of the military profession, yet the ability to determine one’s own truth is highly appealing for many elites within society.⁵³ As Huntington described it, the “military ethic consequently is a constant standard by which it is possible to judge the professionalism of any officer corps anywhere anytime.”⁵⁴ This same ethical consistency is applied to society writ large, which is often found wanting in the eyes of the military.

The moral ambiguity that is so important to many elite decisionmakers is often in short supply when examining the military.

Thus, the decisions a military leader is likely to make are constrained by a clear sense of black and white—absent shades of gray. As the Nation continues to rely on an all-volunteer force, the military worldview will likely persist and may become more prevalent.

Politics. The strong affiliation that many members of the military have with the Republican Party is a marked example of a Judeo-Christian worldview set to politics. It is an affiliation that crosses the officer/enlisted barrier, but is most pronounced in the officer corps and, more specifically, the Air Force.⁵⁵ During the 2008 Presidential election, Servicemembers supported Senator John McCain by a strong majority, despite the unpopularity of a “Republican war” in Iraq that has taxed the military and its families.⁵⁶

The strong affiliation to the Republican Party is often dismissed as an alignment of convenience since Republicans favor military over social spending, but this answer fails to demonstrate a fundamental understanding of the strong moral and ethical disposition that governs military life and thinking. As Huntington noted more than 50 years ago, the military mind exemplifies “conservative realism.” Highly skeptical of intrinsic good, the military strongly adheres to President Ronald Reagan’s motto of “trust, but verify.”

Believing that man is a fallen creature and wicked by nature, the military is suspicious of grand proposals for creating world peace. As mentioned earlier, optimism is a core trait for successful leadership. It could be said that the military has a large number of skeptical optimists.

The portrait painted in the preceding pages describes the average Soldier, Sailor, Marine, or Airman, but may not look like any single Servicemember. It is based on the results of demographic data, surveys, history, and anecdotal evidence. Thus, it has limitations.

Without revisiting the entirety of his groundbreaking work, the evidence suggests that Samuel Huntington’s description of the military in 1957 remains valid over half a century later. It also suggests that the all-volunteer force is increasingly selecting an above-average group of young men and women to serve the Nation. Conservative politically and morally, the American military remains largely male, white, and young. Its members are courageous, hardy risk-takers who show a lack of prudence. Extroverted and open to new experiences, the military is likely to eschew grand schemes of world peace as it looks skeptically at the Nation’s adversaries. In the end, its leaders are slow to act and quick to seek consensus. If the historical record is accurate, it is much the same today as it has been. **JFQ**

NOTES

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² Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960), vii.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957).

⁴ Thomas E. Ricks, “The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (July 1997), 66–78; Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

⁵ Sean Alfano, “Rangel Will Push to Bring Back the Draft,” November 20, 2006, available at <www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/19/ftn/main2199539.shtml>.

⁶ Tim Kane, *Who Are the Recruits? The Demographic Characteristics of US Military Enlistment, 2003–2005* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2006), 3.

⁷ There is no explanation in the data as to why \$80,000–\$84,999 is not included.

⁸ Tim Kane, *Who Bears the Burden: Demographic Characteristics of Military Recruits Before and after 9/11* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2005), 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁰ Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray discuss these issues in detail in several chapters of *The Bell Curve* (New York: Free Press, 1994), and a brief discussion by Murray can be found at <www.cpsimoes.net/artigos/art_iq_succ.html>. See also Peter Hartmann et al., “Personality as Predictor of Achievement,” *Journal of Individual Differences* 30, no. 2 (January 2009), 65–74.

¹¹ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *2006 Population Representation in the Military Services* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006).

¹² Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *2006 Population Representation in the Military Services—Appendix B* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006).

¹³ *Ibid.*, tables B–4 through B–7.

¹⁴ Harvey Joanning, “The Academic Performance of Vietnam Veteran College Students,” *Journal of College Student Personnel* 16, no. 1 (January 1975), 10–13.

¹⁵ Defense Manpower Data Center, *Historical Data Tables* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), table D–22.

¹⁶ Kane, 7.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁸ David Segal and Mady Segal, “America’s Military Population,” *Population Bulletin* 59, no. 1 (December 2004), 18–25.

¹⁹ The overrepresentation of blacks is more striking when it is thought of within the context of “eligible” blacks (ages 18–24) rather than the total black population. As a whole, blacks are less likely to be eligible for military service than whites. This means the military is recruiting a high percentage of the best and brightest black Americans. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Racial Differences Exist, with Blacks Disproportionately Represented among Homicide Victims and Offenders,” July 2007, available at <www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/race.htm>;



U.S. Marine Corps (Ronald W. Stauffer)

Navy chaplain conducts religious service at Kandahar Air Field

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²² Amy Lutz, "Who Joins the Military? A Look at Race, Class, and Immigration Status," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 36, no. 2 (2008), 167–188.

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²⁴ Segal and Segal, 10.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁷ Kane, 12.

²⁸ Sean Hammill, "Small Towns Pay Big Price in Fighting Nation's Wars," *Chicago Tribune*, April 27, 2005, 6.

²⁹ GAO, 79; Meredith Kleykamp, "College, Jobs, or the Military? Enlistment During a Time of War," *Social Science Quarterly* 87, no. 2 (June 2006), 272–290.

³⁰ Pauline Jelinek, "75% of Young People Are Ineligible for Military Service," Associated Press, March 13, 2006.

³¹ G.W. Allport and H.S. Odbert, "Trait-names: A Psycho-lexical Study," *Psychological Monographs*, no. 47 (1933), 171–220.

³² Among the tools/methodologies most commonly used to study personality and leadership in the military are the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Automated Aircrew Personality Inventory, and Hogan Personality Inventory. Each develops a "personality composite" by examining a range of individual characteristics, which may range from as few as 5 to as many as 310.

³³ Paul T. Bartone et al., "Cognitive and Personality Predictors of Leader Performance in West Point Cadets," *Military Psychology* 14, no. 4 (2002), 321–338; Judith Johnson and Will Hill, "Personality Traits and Military Leadership," *Individual Differences Research* 7, no. 1 (2009), 1–13; Michael Matthews et al., "Character Strengths and Virtues of Developing Military Leaders: An International Comparison," *Military Psychology* 18, no. 3S (July 2006), S57–S68; Frederick Siem, "The Use of Response Latencies to Enhance Self-Report Personality Measures," *Military Psychology* 8, no. 1 (1996), 15–27; James Driskell et al., "Cognitive and Personality Predictors of Training Performance," *Military Psychology* 6, no. 1 (1994), 31–46; Paul T. Bartone, "The Need for Positive Meaning in Military Operations: Reflections on Abu Ghraib," *Military Psychology* 17, no. 4 (2005), 315–324.

³⁴ Burke Davis, *Marine! The Life of Chesty Puller* (New York: Bantam, 1962), 296.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Nicole Bell et al., "Demographic, Physical, and Mental Health Factors Associated with Deployment of Army Soldiers to the Persian Gulf," *Military Medicine* 165, no. 10 (2000), 762–772.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁸ Davis, chapter 10.

³⁹ Warren Kozak, *LeMay* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2009), 108–117.

⁴⁰ S.R. Maddi, "The Existential Neurosis," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 72 (1967), 311–325; S.R. Maddi and S.C. Kobasa, *The Hardy Executive* (Homewood, IL: Dow Jones, 1984).

⁴¹ Matthews et al., S64.

⁴² See Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., *19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2003).

⁴³ Driskell et al.

⁴⁴ Johnson and Hill, 1.

⁴⁵ R.E. Cristal, "Recurrent Factors Based on Trait Ratings," *Journal of Personality* 60 (1992), 221–224.

⁴⁶ Johnson and Hill, 3–4.

⁴⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower is perhaps the best example of a consensus-seeker, particularly during World War II. George Patton, on the other hand, was one of the Nation's great warrior-commanders, but failed to reach the highest ranks because of inability to work cooperatively with, for example, Bernard Montgomery. See Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991); and Stanley Hirshon, *General Patton: A Soldier's Life* (New York: Harper, 2003).

⁴⁸ Charles Colson and Nancy Pearcey, *How Now Shall We Live?* (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale, 1993).

⁴⁹ Charles Colson and Nancy Pearcey, *The Problem of Evil* (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale, 2001).

⁵⁰ Ricks, 69.

⁵¹ Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, "The Gap," *The National Interest* (Fall 2000), 31. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life periodically conducts the U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, which is the most comprehensive survey of religion in the United States.

⁵² Lydia Saad, "Church-Going among U.S. Catholics Slides to Tie Protestants," *Gallup*, April 9, 2009, available at <www.gallup.com/poll/117382/Church-Going-Among-Catholics-Slides-Tie-Protestants.aspx>.

⁵³ Jim Herrick, *Humanism: An Introduction* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005).

⁵⁴ Huntington, 62.

⁵⁵ Ole Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the US Military and Civilian Society?" *International Security* 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/1999), 5–42; Jerald Bachman et al., "Distinctive Military Attitudes among U.S. Enlistees, 1976–1997: Self-Selection Versus Socialization," *Armed Forces and Society* 26, no. 4 (Summer 2000), 561–585.

⁵⁶ Brendan McGarry, "Military Times Poll: Troops Backing McCain," *Army Times*, October 9, 2008, available at <www.armytimes.com/news/2008/10/military_poll_100508w/>.

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